Travel
By Oumarou Sanou
With hardly a month to precede the Third Russia-Africa Summit, set up for 28– 29 October in Moscow, African delegations deal with a concern that has absolutely nothing to do with diplomacy and whatever to do with math: is it worth the danger of flying into a capital that Ukrainian drones now reach with uneasy consistency, and what, specifically, does Africa get for making the journey at all?
The security concern responses itself. On 6 October, approximately 650 drones struck the Moscow area in among the biggest such attacks of the war, eliminating 2 individuals and setting a storage facility ablaze; it followed a 20 September attack in which some 450 drones were focused on the capital particularly, part of a larger barrage of 1,600 released throughout Russia that day. These are not separated events however a pattern, and one that has actually currently reached African providers straight. In early September, Air Tanzania suspended its Dar es Salaam-Moscow path following a danger evaluation, resuming it only days later on under business and diplomatic pressure. “If Air Tanzania evaluated it essential to momentarily suspend its flights, it was not without factor,” a Tanzanian authorities near to the matter is reported to have actually stated. “But what occurs if Moscow is struck once again throughout the top, or if air defences are triggered while we exist?”
That concern should have more than Moscow’s choreography will permit. The risk is not that Ukraine would intentionally target an African delegation; it is that civilian air travel and live air defence operations now share the exact same airspace over the exact same city, with precedents that ought to focus minds. In 2014, flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine, eliminating all 298 individuals aboard. In December 2024, Azerbaijan Airlines flight J2-8243 crashed after obviously being struck throughout Russian air defence operations versus drones, eliminating 38. Neither included an African provider, however both reveal what occurs when industrial airplane fly through objected to skies.

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“If Russia can not protect its own capital, exactly what is it providing the African federal governments that have concerned treat it as a security guarantor?”
Moscow’s pitch to Africa rests on a narrower property than its rhetoric recommends, not advancement, not shared success, however security, provided through personal military specialists and now the state-run Africa Corps in Mali, the Central African Republic and beyond. Putin stated in 2023 that Russia had military-technical cooperation arrangements with more than 40 African states; United States congressional research study has actually determined routine security, not institution-building, as the primary tourist attraction. That relative benefit is greatest specifically where African organizations are weakest, which is a various service from advancement completely.
The financial case is no stronger. At the inaugural Sochi top in 2019, Putin set a target of approximately doubling Russia-Africa trade within 4 to 5 years, suggesting a figure near $40bn. By Lavrov’s own account, 2025 turnover was available in at simply over $27bn, and Russia still represents less than 1% of foreign direct financial investment into Africa. That space has actually not gone undetected inside the delegations themselves. “It would be intriguing to talk about the ‘win-win’ element of this collaboration. In the meantime, that is not the case,” a source near to Ghana’s delegation stated, including specifically: “AI can wait, political stability can not,” a rejoinder intended directly at Lavrov’s own list of top priorities, expert system, digital payments, alternative currencies, which checks out less like an African program than one exported wholesale from Moscow. Gabon has actually apparently settled the matter outright, decreasing to send its president or his inner circle to a top held far from its borders and even more still from its people’ issues.
More unpleasant than the shortage is what significantly fills it. A United States Congressional Research Service evaluation keeps in mind reports that African gold and other resources have actually assisted Russia cushion sanctions pressure. Now another resource appears significantly appropriate: individuals. Amnesty International’s September examination recorded misleading and coercive recruitment of foreign nationals, disproportionately from poorer Global South nations, into Russia’s militaries, concluding that in most cases the practices totaled up to human trafficking. A collaboration can not credibly be called equally useful if Africans looking for normal tasks wind up providing workforce for somebody else’s war.
This is likewise why the top’s area is worthy of examination, not simply its program. Russia has actually now held 3 tops with Africa, Sochi in 2019, St Petersburg in 2023, Moscow in 2026, and has never ever when brought the event to African soil.
Compare that with France’s Africa Forward Summit, kept in Nairobi on 11– 12 May 2026 and co-chaired collectively by Macron and Kenya’s president, the very first such top in Africa, with African hosts, African procedure and African assembling power. Whatever one considers France’s own record on the continent, the option of place signified something Moscow has actually never ever used: dealing with African leaders as co-chairs of their own collaboration instead of guests to somebody else’s capital. If Russia’s engagement with Africa is truly a collaboration of equates to instead of a presentation of whose capital commands the visitor list, there is no structural factor the next top might not be kept in Addis Ababa, Nairobi or Abuja, co-chaired by an African president. That it has actually not been, after 3 editions, states as much about the relationship as any communiqué will.
None of this argues for severing ties with Moscow. Russia stays a considerable arms provider and a helpful counterweight for states diversifying far from previous colonial customers, and tactical autonomy suggests keeping choices open, not foreclosing them. Engagement is not deference, and a top is not proof that a collaboration is working. As one authorities near to the preparations put it: “For 3 years now we have actually been going over a top kept in Africa; it stays a dead letter. On top of that, we now run the danger of being bombed.” Before African leaders indication on to another round of statements in a city that can not completely ensure their physical security, the least they owe their own residents is a truthful response: if Russia can not secure itself, and will not even satisfy Africa midway by itself soil, just what is this collaboration securing?
Oumarou Sanou is a social critic, Pan-African observer and scientist concentrating on governance, security and political shifts in the Sahel. He composes on geopolitics, local stability and African management characteristics. Contact: [email protected]
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